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  Abstract	  
	  In	  2009	  the	  governmental	  monopoly	  on	  the	  Swedish	  pharmaceutical	  market	  was	  abolished.	  Coinciding	  with	  this	  reform,	  a	  new	  set	  of	  rules	  and	  proceedings	  concerning	  mandatory	  substitution	  was	  adopted.	  In	  this	  paper	  a	  difference	  in	  difference	  analysis	  is	  applied	  in	  order	  to	  estimate	  the	  immediate	  impact	  of	  theses	  new	  rules	  on	  the	  prices	  of	  the	  pharmaceuticals.	  	  The	  result	  was	  an	  estimated	  average	  prices	  drop	  of	  4.9%	  among	  products	  facing	  generic	  competition.	  Further	  inquiries	  into	  the	  factors	  behind	  the	  effect,	  points	  to	  a	  pattern	  of	  price	  drops	  increasing	  with	  the	  number	  of	  competitors	  a	  product	  faces.	  A	  pattern	  such	  as	  this	  could	  be	  indicative	  of	  low	  levels	  of	  competition	  within	  a	  market.	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1.	  Introduction	  	  	  There	  is	  no	  obvious	  reason	  to	  consider	  any	  factor	  but	  price	  when	  choosing	  among	  generic	  drugs.	  They	  all	  contain	  the	  same	  active	  ingredient.	  The	  drug	  companies	  thus	  possess	  but	  one	  means	  of	  competition:	  to	  reduce	  price.	  The	  market	  for	  generics	  should	  thus	  shove	  the	  companies	  into	  a	  price-­‐cutting	  race	  where	  they	  continuously	  underbid	  one	  another	  in	  order	  to	  dominate	  the	  market.	  Alas,	  the	  overall	  market	  share	  of	  the	  cheapest	  products	  only	  amounted	  to	  around	  41%,	  in	  2008.	  Such	  a	  low	  market	  share	  undoes	  the	  will	  to	  cut	  prices,	  making	  for	  less	  competition	  and	  higher	  prices.	  	  The	  government	  subsidizes	  pharmaceutical	  products	  and	  has	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  lowest	  possible	  prices.	  Therefore	  new	  practices	  were	  introduced	  October	  2009	  to	  make	  the	  patients	  more	  susceptible	  to	  price	  differences,	  and	  thereby	  enhancing	  price	  competition.	  The	  new	  rules	  forces	  pharmacies	  to	  always	  offer	  their	  costumers	  the	  cheapest	  product	  on	  the	  market.	  This	  paper	  aims	  to	  evaluate	  if	  the	  reform	  was	  successful	  or	  not.	  	  
Methodology	  and	  data	  The	  main	  problems	  in	  estimating	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  the	  reform	  on	  generic	  drug	  prices	  is	  the	  many	  other	  factors	  affecting	  prices	  in	  a	  market,	  including	  for	  example	  increasing	  costs,	  business	  cycles	  and	  demand	  shocks.	  To	  isolate	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  the	  reform	  on	  the	  prices	  of	  generics	  I	  have	  therefore	  used	  a	  control	  group	  of	  other	  drugs,	  namely	  all	  drugs	  not	  facing	  generic	  competition.	  More	  precisely,	  I	  have	  studied	  how	  the	  prices	  of	  generic	  drugs	  changed	  around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  reform,	  compared	  to	  how	  the	  prices	  of	  other	  drugs	  changed	  during	  the	  same	  time	  period.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  external	  factors	  such	  as	  cost	  inflation	  affect	  the	  prices	  of	  generic	  drugs	  and	  the	  control	  drugs	  in	  roughly	  the	  same	  way.	  Thus,	  if	  the	  prices	  of	  drugs	  facing	  generic	  competition	  fell	  more	  than	  the	  prices	  in	  the	  control	  group,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  reform	  has	  had	  an	  effect.	  	  This	  methodology	  is	  usually	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  difference	  in	  difference	  (DiD)	  analysis.	  	  I	  have	  limited	  the	  comparison	  to	  eight	  month	  before	  and	  eight	  month	  after	  the	  reform.	  This	  limitation	  is	  due	  to	  the	  assumption	  of	  parallel	  trend	  that	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  for	  DiD	  analysis	  to	  yield	  unbiased	  results.	  I	  have	  collected	  a	  sample	  of	  prices	  observed	  
2	  
through	  rulings	  conducted	  by	  TLV.	  The	  price1	  will	  be	  observed	  as	  price	  per	  defined	  daily	  dosage.	  	  
Results	  The	  estimation	  acquired	  through	  this	  method	  indicated	  an	  average	  price	  drop	  among	  affected	  products	  of	  -­‐4.90%	  within	  the	  eight	  months	  following	  the	  reform.	  Taking	  the	  standard	  error	  of	  the	  estimate	  into	  account,	  the	  effect,	  the	  true	  average	  effect	  of	  reform,	  with	  95%	  probability	  is	  found	  within	  the	  closed	  interval	  [-­‐7.74,	  -­‐1.97].	  This	  could	  in	  this	  case	  be	  considered	  a	  quite	  wide	  interval	  but	  still	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  the	  average	  price	  drop	  is	  statistically	  significant	  among	  products	  facing	  generic	  competition.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  reform	  has	  on	  average	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  price	  of	  pharmaceuticals	  in	  the	  time	  periods	  following	  the	  reform.	  
	  
What	  does	  the	  change	  in	  prices	  say	  about	  the	  level	  of	  competition?	  A	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  reveals	  that	  prices	  fell	  more	  in	  markets	  with	  more	  competitors.	  In	  markets	  with	  only	  two	  competitors	  the	  effect	  was	  virtually	  zero	  while	  in	  markets	  with	  sixteen	  or	  more	  competitors	  the	  prices	  fell	  by	  almost	  9	  %.	  These	  results	  are	  presented	  below	  in	  Table	  1	  and	  illustrated	  in	  Graph	  1.	  	  	  	  














Estimate	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟏	   0,18	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟐	   -­‐1,88	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟑	   -­‐4,21*	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟒	   -­‐4,86**	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟓	   -­‐5,88**	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟔	   -­‐8,53**	  
Graph	  1.	  	  Upper	  and	  lower	  boundary	  level	  along	  
with	  point	  estimation	  of	  the	  parameters	  𝛃𝟏  𝐭𝐨  𝛃𝟔	  
Table	  1.	  Estimated	  	  
price	  drop	  in	  %	  	  
Notes:	  the	  asterisks	  **,	  *	  
indicate	  significance	  at	  level	  
0.05	  and	  0.01	  based	  on	  robust	  
standard	  errors.	  	  
	  
3	  
These	  results	  may	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  indication	  that	  competition	  is	  relatively	  lax	  in	  the	  generic	  market.	  	  Standard	  oligopoly	  theory	  (Bertrand	  competition	  with	  differentiated	  goods)	  suggests	  that	  the	  intensity	  of	  market	  competition	  is	  determined	  both	  by	  the	  number	  of	  competing	  products	  and	  how	  willing	  consumers	  are	  to	  substitute	  between	  the	  products.	  When	  competition	  is	  lax	  these	  two	  factors	  are	  complementary.	  For	  example,	  a	  willingness	  to	  substitute	  does	  not	  have	  any	  effects	  if	  only	  one	  product	  is	  supplied.	  And	  having	  several	  products	  doesn’t	  create	  price	  competition	  if	  consumers	  are	  not	  willing	  to	  substitute.	  But	  when	  competition	  is	  hard	  the	  two	  factors	  are	  substitutes.	  For	  example,	  if	  there	  are	  very	  many	  firms	  in	  the	  market	  and	  consumers	  are	  at	  least	  modestly	  willing	  to	  substitute,	  then	  prices	  will	  be	  close	  to	  cost.	  Then,	  increasing	  the	  consumers’	  willingness	  to	  substitute	  will	  have	  little	  effect	  on	  prices.	  	  
	  
Background	  and	  previous	  studies	  Sweden’s	  system	  of	  statutory	  health	  insurance	  has	  covered	  pharmaceutical	  cost	  for	  Swedish	  citizens	  wholly	  or	  in	  part	  since	  1955.	  The	  Swedish	  market	  for	  pharmaceuticals	  consists	  of	  brand	  name	  products	  and	  generics.	  The	  cost	  of	  this	  coverage	  amounted	  in	  2008	  to	  around	  1.2%	  of	  Sweden’s	  GDP	  according	  to	  OECD	  (OECD,	  2008).	  In	  order	  to	  lessen	  the	  cost	  of	  coverage,	  the	  principals	  governing	  the	  way	  and	  the	  extent	  in	  which	  a	  product	  is	  subsidized,	  on	  several	  occasions	  have	  been	  reformed.	  	  In	  1993	  the	  reference	  price	  system	  was	  implemented.	  This	  system	  dictated	  that	  the	  government	  was	  to	  cover	  a	  sum	  equal	  to	  110%	  of	  the	  price	  of	  the	  cheapest	  available	  pharmaceutical	  product	  at	  the	  pharmacy.	  If	  the	  patient	  out	  of	  free	  will	  were	  to	  choose	  a	  product	  with	  a	  price	  above	  the	  covered	  level	  he	  would	  have	  to	  cover	  the	  difference	  in	  price	  out	  of	  pocket.	  According	  to	  a	  study	  conducted	  by	  Rudholm,	  Aronsson	  and	  Bergman(2001)	  the	  market	  share	  of	  brand	  products	  that	  kept	  a	  relatively	  high	  price	  significantly	  decreased	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  this	  reform.	  This	  implies	  that	  price	  sensitivity	  would	  have	  increased	  among	  consumers	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  coverage	  for	  the	  government,	  decreased.	  	  Reference	  pricing	  was	  further	  reformed	  in	  2002	  to	  include	  mandatory	  substitution.	  Mandatory	  substitution	  brought	  new	  rules	  for	  Swedish	  pharmacists,	  who	  now	  were	  obligated	  to	  inform	  and	  offer	  the	  costumer	  the	  cheapest	  product	  available	  in	  stock.	  This	  is	  unless	  the	  prescribing	  doctor	  explicitly	  prohibits	  substitution.	  The	  primary	  goal	  of	  this	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is	  increasing	  information	  among	  consumers.	  In	  addition	  the	  reform	  also	  changed	  the	  level	  of	  reimbursement	  from	  110%	  of	  the	  cheapest	  product	  to	  100%.	  This	  further	  increases	  the	  incentive	  among	  consumers	  to	  choose	  the	  cheapest	  product	  available.	  Making	  pharmacist	  obligated	  to	  inform	  the	  consumer	  about	  the	  costs	  of	  choosing	  a	  more	  expensive	  product	  were	  supposed	  to	  make	  the	  consumers	  more	  prices	  sensitive.	  This	  would	  in	  turn	  increase	  the	  degree	  of	  substitution	  among	  the	  competing	  products.	  If	  this	  were	  to	  be	  the	  case	  the	  manufacturers	  would	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  lower	  its	  prices	  resulting	  in	  lower	  subsidizing	  costs	  for	  the	  government.	  Generally	  the	  role	  consumer	  information	  plays	  when	  determining	  the	  price	  of	  a	  product	  and	  market	  structure	  is	  since	  long	  well	  documented	  (G.J	  Stigler,	  1961)(P.A.	  Diamond,	  1971).	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  pharmaceutical	  markets	  information	  among	  consumers	  also	  have	  proven	  to	  have	  a	  crucial	  effect	  on	  pricing.	  The	  effects	  going	  so	  far	  that	  just	  simply	  introduction	  of	  generic	  competition	  without	  adequate	  information	  have	  been	  known	  to	  in	  some	  cases	  increase	  the	  price	  of	  brand-­‐name	  drugs	  (R.G	  Frank	  &	  D.S.	  Salkever,	  1991).	  This	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  expect	  a	  decrease	  in	  prices	  following	  the	  reform.	  This	  reform	  has	  according	  to	  Granlund(2010)	  had	  positive	  effects	  on	  competition	  resulting	  in	  a	  average	  price	  drop	  of	  10%	  mainly	  among	  brand-­‐name	  products.	  Other	  studies	  however,	  concerning	  the	  introduction	  of	  such	  systems	  in	  other	  countries	  have	  presented	  results	  contrary	  to	  Granlunds	  findings,	  especially	  when	  considering	  brand-­‐name	  drugs	  (Wiggins,	  S.	  N.	  &	  R.	  Maness,	  2004)(Grabowski,	  H	  G	  &	  J	  M	  Vernon,	  1992).	  These	  mixed	  conclusions	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  issue	  is	  in	  many	  respects	  complex,	  and	  no	  outcome	  is	  by	  any	  means	  guaranteed.	  	  Furthermore	  a	  study	  by	  Granlund	  and	  Köksal(2011),	  argued	  that	  the	  mandatory	  substitution	  reform	  had	  a	  impact	  on	  prices	  trough	  competition.	  Among	  products	  facing	  therapeutic	  competition	  the	  prices	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  1.5%	  lower.	  The	  reform	  proved	  however	  to	  be	  a	  poor	  amplifier	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  competition	  from	  parallel	  imports.	  In	  excess	  of	  these	  studies	  Buzzelli	  et	  al	  2006	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  all	  OECD	  countries	  the	  introduction	  of	  mandatory	  substitution	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  decrease	  in	  prices.	  	  Since	  the	  reform	  in	  2002	  it	  has	  become	  apparent	  that	  even	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  mandatory	  substitution	  the	  cheapest	  products	  on	  the	  market	  held	  a	  relatively	  low	  share	  of	  the	  total	  sales,	  41%	  according	  to	  the	  Dental	  and	  Pharmaceutical	  Benefits	  Agency,	  Swedish	  acronym.	  (TLV,	  2011).	  	  These	  findings	  should	  be	  unexpected	  in	  a	  market	  where	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the	  competing	  products	  are	  close	  to	  identical.	  Though	  could	  be	  a	  result	  of	  the	  subsidy	  effectively	  decreasing	  consumer	  price	  sensitivity,	  making	  consumers	  less	  likely	  to	  consider	  price	  when	  filling	  a	  prescription.	  Nevertheless	  this	  served	  as	  an	  indication	  that	  there	  are	  opportunities	  to	  further	  increase	  competition,	  thereby	  lessening	  the	  cost	  put	  on	  the	  government.	  The	  need	  for	  increased	  price	  sensitivity	  among	  consumers	  was	  further	  increased	  with	  the	  proposed	  deregulation	  of	  the	  market.	  Since	  private	  pharmacist	  when	  considering	  their	  bottom	  line,	  would	  have	  no	  incentives	  to	  prioritise	  selling	  cheap	  products.	  With	  this	  as	  background	  the	  system	  of	  mandatory	  substitution	  were,	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  deregulation	  of	  the	  pharmacy	  market,	  reformed	  again	  in	  2009.	  The	  new	  reform	  brought	  new	  rules	  to	  how	  mandatory	  substitution	  was	  conducted	  in	  Swedish	  pharmacies.	  According	  to	  the	  new	  reform	  all	  pharmacies	  had	  a	  responsibility	  to	  acquire	  and	  keep	  a	  supply	  of	  the	  cheapest	  products	  on	  the	  market	  to	  be	  available	  to	  the	  consumer.	  Aside	  from	  increasing	  the	  consumer	  information	  about	  the	  price	  relations	  on	  the	  market	  this	  also	  made	  the	  cheapest	  product	  on	  the	  market	  available	  everywhere.	  The	  hopes	  were	  that	  these	  factors	  would	  further	  increase	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	  market.	  	  In	  order	  to	  continuously	  determine	  which	  product	  is	  cheapest,	  a	  monthly	  auction	  is	  held	  at	  the	  Dental	  and	  Pharmaceutical	  Benefits	  Agency	  (TLV).	  The	  competing	  manufacturers	  of	  every	  pharmaceutical	  products	  regularly	  submit	  their	  prices	  and	  the	  agency	  determine	  what	  product	  is	  to	  be	  the	  stocked	  by	  Swedish	  pharmacies.	  The	  chosen	  product	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  “Product	  of	  the	  Period”.	  From	  this	  follows	  that	  producers	  must	  compete	  by	  underbidding	  each	  other	  to	  be	  chosen	  to	  deliver	  the	  “Product	  of	  the	  Period”.	  This	  would	  supposedly	  force	  down	  the	  price	  on	  the	  products	  included	  in	  the	  governmental	  coverage.	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2.	  Method,	  assumptions	  and	  data	  
	  
2.1.	  The	  data	  	  The	  data	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  all	  available	  trough	  the	  “The	  Dental	  and	  Pharmaceutical	  Benefits	  Agency”	  (TLV).	  The	  time	  series	  have	  been	  constructed	  from	  historical	  prices	  available	  from	  2002	  to	  2012	  observed	  through	  rulings	  by	  the	  agency.	  The	  rulings	  ranges	  from	  price	  changes	  to	  introductions	  of	  new	  product	  as	  well	  as	  exits.	  In	  total	  178881	  observations	  are	  available	  for	  the	  analysis,	  containing	  price	  information	  on	  every	  drug	  that	  is	  subsidized	  in	  Sweden.	  	  From	  these	  observations	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  construct	  individual	  time	  series	  for	  every	  drug	  and	  ultimately	  create	  panel	  data.	  Beyond	  price	  information	  the	  data	  contain	  information	  on	  the	  name	  of	  the	  manufacturer,	  the	  “Anatomical	  Therapeutic	  Chemical”(ATC)	  code,	  NPL	  identification	  as	  well	  as	  package	  NPL.	  The	  ATC	  code	  is	  a	  system	  of	  classification	  among	  pharmaceutical	  product.	  The	  NPL	  identification	  is	  kept	  by	  the	  Swedish	  Medical	  product	  agency	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  distinguish	  a	  specific	  product	  and	  package	  from	  the	  mass.	  	  From	  these	  variables	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  apart	  from	  the	  price	  series	  calculate	  the	  number	  of	  different	  manufacturers	  within	  an	  ATC	  code	  at	  a	  given	  time.	  This	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  number	  of	  competitors	  of	  a	  given	  product	  on	  the	  Swedish	  pharmaceutical	  market2.	  All	  rearrangements	  and	  transposes	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  this	  are	  available	  in	  Appendix	  1.	  The	  total	  amount	  of	  pharmaceuticals	  used	  in	  the	  final	  analysis	  exceeds	  8000.	  	  Making	  use	  of	  a	  dataset	  of	  this	  size	  opens	  up	  additional	  aspects	  to	  consider	  when	  making	  inference.	  Due	  to	  the	  shear	  size	  of	  the	  dataset	  any	  difference	  in	  the	  data	  will	  most	  likely	  prove	  to	  be	  statistically	  significant.	  This	  statistical	  significance	  is	  distinctly	  different	  from	  economic	  significant,	  as	  discussed	  by	  McCloskey	  and	  Ziliak	  (1996).	  The	  core	  of	  their	  argument	  is	  that	  statistical	  significance	  does	  not	  translate	  into	  economic	  importance.	  A	  parameter	  could	  prove	  to	  be	  statically	  different	  from	  zero	  but	  so	  insignificant	  in	  magnitude	  as	  to	  carry	  no	  economic	  importance.	  This	  very	  point	  has	  been	  argued	  in	  other	  applications	  as	  well,	  in	  statistics	  in	  general	  (T.	  Wonnacott,	  1987)	  and	  in	  medicine	  (M.J.	  Gardner	  &	  D.J.	  Altman	  1986).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Any	  competition	  between	  different	  active	  substances	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  Therapeutic	  Competition,	  is	  not	  accounted	  for	  in	  this	  paper.	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To	  focus	  the	  results	  in	  this	  thesis	  on	  economical	  significance	  more	  then	  the	  statistical	  the	  results	  will	  mainly	  be	  focused	  on	  the	  inference	  considering	  the	  parameters	  magnitude.	  	  	  
2.2.	  The	  price	  variable	  The	  price	  of	  interest	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  pharmacy’s	  purchasing	  price	  of	  a	  given	  pharmaceutical	  product	  (AIP).	  The	  first	  problem	  to	  arise	  when	  measuring	  how	  big	  effect	  the	  reform	  has	  had	  on	  price	  will	  be	  the	  unit	  of	  choice.	  The	  price	  of	  one	  unit	  of	  a	  product	  over	  time	  in	  the	  form	  it	  is	  observed	  in	  the	  dataset	  would	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  changes	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  product.	  A	  change	  in	  price	  could	  as	  an	  example	  also	  come	  about	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  concentration	  or	  size	  of	  one	  unit	  not	  affecting	  the	  actual	  cost	  of	  usage.	  It	  is	  an	  issue	  of	  nominal	  contra	  real	  price	  change.	  To	  correct	  for	  this	  risk	  all	  prices	  will	  be	  rewritten	  from	  price	  per	  unit	  to	  price	  per	  Defined	  Daily	  Dosage	  (DDD).	  The	  DDD	  of	  a	  substance	  is	  estimated	  by	  the	  WHO	  Collaborating	  Centre	  for	  Drug	  Statistics	  Methodology	  (WHOCC)	  and	  is	  should	  represent	  the	  average	  dose	  per	  day	  necessary	  for	  the	  drug	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  its	  main	  purpose	  when	  used	  by	  an	  adult.	  	  The	  DDD	  of	  a	  product	  is	  tied	  to	  its	  ATC	  code	  and	  is	  established	  for	  every	  active	  substance	  used	  in	  pharmaceuticals	  that	  has	  an	  ATC	  code.	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Graph	  2.	  Histogram	  of	  the	  observed	  prices	  (p).	  	  
Table	  2.	  Percentiles	  
of	  the	  observed	  price	  
(p).	  
2.3.	  Distribution	  and	  measuring	  of	  central	  tendencies	  In	  order	  to	  choose	  a	  model	  in	  which	  to	  estimate	  effect	  of	  the	  reform	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  price	  variable	  must	  be	  considered.	  Analysing	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  observed	  pharmaceutical	  prices	  in	  the	  histogram	  below	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  prices	  are	  clustered	  in	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  distribution	  while	  also	  proving	  to	  have	  a	  long	  tail	  of	  extreme	  observations.	  This	  is	  problematic	  when	  measuring	  central	  tendencies	  in	  a	  sample.	  	  	  
Percentiles	   p	  
1%	   0.130	  
5%	   0.405	  
10%	   0.720	  
25%	   1.907	  
50%	   6.139	  
75%	   22.201	  
90%	   63.367	  
95%	   104.3	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data	  will	  be	  normally	  distributed.	  Such	  a	  distribution	  would	  suggest	  that	  a	  linear	  regression	  model	  is	  a	  good	  way	  of	  making	  point	  estimations.	  As	  seen	  below	  in	  Graph	  2	  applying	  the	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  the	  price	  data	  corrects	  for	  the	  previously	  observed	  skewness	  in	  a	  somewhat	  gratifying	  way.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Even	  thought	  the	  new	  form	  might	  not	  be	  strictly	  normally	  distributed	  it	  validates	  a	  linear	  regression	  as	  a	  viable	  method	  for	  estimating	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  reform.	  	  Assuming	  the	  true	  distribution	  of	  the	  variable	  p	  to	  be	  log-­‐normally	  distributed	  implies	  that	  the	  true	  model	  is	  multiplicative.	  	   	  
Percentiles	   ln(p)	  
1%	   -­‐2.040	  
5%	   -­‐0.904	  
10%	   -­‐0.329	  
25%	   0.646	  
50%	   1.815	  
75%	   3.100	  
90%	   4.149	  
95%	   4.647	  
99%	   5.908	  
Graph	  3.	  Histogram	  of	  the	  logarithm	  of	  prices	  
(p).	  	  
Table	  3.	  Percentiles	  
of	  the	  logarithm	  price	  
(p).	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Graph	  4.	  	  Difference	  in	  Difference	  estimation	  of	  
treatment	  effects.	  
2.4.	  Difference	  in	  Difference	  	  In	  order	  to	  estimate	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  reform,	  a	  difference	  in	  difference	  regression	  will	  be	  conducted.	  	  The	  Difference	  in	  Difference	  regression	  (DiD)	  uses	  a	  control	  group	  not	  affected	  by	  the	  reform	  in	  order	  to	  separate	  the	  theoretical	  case	  of	  “no	  reform”	  from	  the	  actual	  case	  in	  the	  affected	  group,	  the	  test	  group.	  In	  this	  study	  the	  control	  group	  are	  products	  not	  facing	  generic	  competition.	  	  Accounting	  for	  the	  permanent	  difference	  between	  the	  groups	  and	  the	  common	  trend,	  i.e.	  a	  time	  specific	  effect,	  renders	  it	  possible	  to	  isolate	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  reform.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  graphically	  with	  hypothetical	  data	  in	  Graph	  4.	  In	  the	  graph	  a	  fictive	  reform	  takes	  place	  when	  t	  is	  100.	  












The	  regression	  analysis	  will	  be	  carried	  out	  using	  the	  products	  protected	  by	  patent	  as	  a	  control	  group	  to	  the	  products	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  generic	  competition.	  The	  test	  group	  will	  be	  denoted	  as	  Generics,	  assuming	  values	  one	  or	  zero.	  To	  ensure	  that	  the	  two	  groups	  are	  completely	  separated	  no	  protected	  product	  whose	  patent	  expires	  within	  the	  estimation	  period	  will	  be	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  The	  regression	  model	  will	  be	  defined	  as:	  	  𝑙𝑛 𝑝 = 𝛼!   + 𝛽!𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽!𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 + 𝛽!(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚)+ 𝜀,	  	  
	  where	  𝐸 𝜀 = 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑉 𝜀 =   𝜎!!	  	  This	  model	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  equation	  1.	  Point	  estimation	  of	  the	  parameters	  will	  be	  conducted	  on	  the	  prices	  observed	  between	  January	  2009,	  and	  June	  2010,	  using	  OLS.	  The	  first	  exogenous	  shock	  accounted	  for	  is	  the	  agreement	  between	  the	  Swedish	  government	  and	  brand-­‐drug	  manufacturers	  to	  set	  prices	  on	  brand-­‐name	  products	  to	  35%	  of	  the	  price	  one	  year	  prior	  to	  the	  patent	  expiration.	  This	  agreement	  took	  effect	  on	  the	  first	  of	  July	  2009	  and	  will	  be	  accounted	  for	  as	  the	  dummy	  variable	  𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡.	  The	  variable	  Reform	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  signalling	  for	  a	  time	  period	  in	  which	  the	  new	  rules	  concerning	  the	  mandatory	  substation	  is	  in	  effect.	  Assuming	  the	  model	  is	  correctly	  specified	  the	  parameter	  𝛽!	  of	  the	  interaction	  term	  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚	  constitutes	  the	  true	  casual	  effect	  of	  the	  reform	  on	  the	  pharmaceuticals	  subject	  to	  generic	  competition.	  	  	  A	  common	  problem	  with	  linear	  OLS	  regression	  is	  heteroskedasticity.	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  situation	  when	  the	  variance	  of	  a	  response	  variable	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  explanatory	  variables.	  In	  this	  context	  this	  would	  be	  the	  case	  if	  the	  reform	  resulted	  in	  higher	  price	  volatility	  then	  was	  the	  case	  before.	  This	  phenomenon	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  estimator’s	  quality	  as	  of	  biasness.	  It	  does	  however	  damage	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  estimators.	  To	  avoid	  any	  problems	  of	  this	  kind	  the	  OLS	  regression	  will	  be	  conducted	  using	  robust	  standard	  errors.	  The	  Huber-­‐White	  sandwich	  estimators	  will	  estimate	  the	  regressions	  robust	  errors.	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2.5.	  The	  parallel	  trend	  assumption	  A	  pivotal	  assumption	  concerning	  the	  control	  group’s	  suitability	  to	  estimate	  the	  causal	  effect	  of	  the	  reform	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  price	  development	  of	  pharmaceuticals	  in	  the	  two	  groups	  would	  have	  been	  similar	  if	  the	  reform	  would	  not	  have	  taken	  place4.	  The	  two	  groups,	  test	  and	  control,	  need	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  common	  trend.	  This	  assumption	  is	  called	  the	  “parallel	  trend	  assumption”.	  The	  DiD	  regression	  relies	  heavily	  on	  this	  assumption	  and	  if	  it	  were	  to	  be	  violated	  the	  estimated	  treatment	  parameter	  would	  be	  biased.	  	  Making	  use	  of	  Graph	  3	  and	  4	  as	  rough	  illustrations	  of	  the	  price	  development,	  these	  two	  groups	  seems	  to	  follow	  a	  similar	  trend	  between	  the	  first	  of	  January	  and	  October	  when	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  agreement	  is	  excluded.	  The	  shocks	  are	  illustrated	  as	  vertical	  lines	  in	  the	  graph.	  The	  trend	  by	  this	  graph	  seems	  to	  not	  be	  different	  from	  zero.	  
	  	  The	  parallel	  trend	  assumption	  lacks	  a	  formal	  test.	  But	  one	  suggested	  method	  of	  controlling	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  assumption	  is	  by	  estimating	  the	  DiD	  regression	  during	  a	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  reform.	  This	  regression	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  placebo	  regression.	  By	  applying	  the	  same	  model	  to	  the	  periods	  preceding	  the	  reform	  t(-­‐1,0)	  any	  effect	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  would	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  differing	  trend	  in	  the	  test	  group.	  	  The	  estimations	  are	  conducted	  by	  Ordinary	  least	  squares	  (OLS)	  and	  presented	  in	  full	  Appendix	  3.	  Below	  are	  the	  point	  estimations	  and	  their	  corresponding	  standard	  errors.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This	  implies	  that	  cov(𝜀,𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚|  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠  ,𝐴𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚) = 0	  
Graph	  6.	  	  Index	  series	  of	  the	  mean	  price	  
in	  the	  test	  and	  control	  groups	  over	  time.	  
Graph	  5.	  	  The	  mean	  price	  in	  the	  test	  and	  























Table	  4.	  Placebo	  equation	  estimation	  results.	  
Notes:	  the	  asterisks	  **,	  *	  indicate	  significance	  at	  level	  0.05	  and	  0.01	  
based	  on	  robust	  standard	  errors.	  	  
	  
Placebo	  regression	  results	  
	   	   	  	   Estimate	   Std.Error	  Generics	  	   -­‐0.7427**	   0.0256	  
Agreement	   -­‐0.0227	   0.0195	  
Reform	   0.0010	   0.0267	  
Reform*Generics	  	   -­‐0.0180	   0.0275	  
α	   2.5908**	   0.0248	  	  	  	  Since	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  treatment	  effect	  estimated	  in	  the	  placebo	  regression	  the	  parallel	  trend	  assumption	  is	  from	  here	  on	  considered	  valid.	  	  Had	  there	  been	  an	  effect	  different	  from	  zero	  there	  would	  have	  been	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  hypothetical	  case	  of	  “no	  reform”	  still	  would	  have	  yielded	  measurable	  differences	  between	  the	  groups.	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2.6.	  The	  impact	  of	  competition	  A	  Bertrand	  model	  extended	  to	  take	  into	  account	  product	  differentiation	  is	  applied	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  theoretical	  background	  to	  the	  problem.	  The	  model	  predicts	  the	  marginal	  effect	  on	  price	  due	  to	  an	  increased	  rate	  of	  substitution	  to	  be	  dependent	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  substitution	  and	  number	  of	  competitors	  preceding	  the	  increase5.	  Rate	  of	  substitution	  is	  denoted	  𝜎	  and	  taking	  on	  values	  between	  zero	  and	  one,	  where	  one	  implies	  perfect	  substitution.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  below	  with	  sigma03	  signifying	  an	  initial	  level	  of	  substitution	  of	  0.3,	  and	  sigma07	  a	  level	  of	  0.7.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  graph	  illustrates	  two	  distinguishable	  scenarios	  concerning	  the	  effect	  pattern.	  The	  first,	  decreasing	  effect	  with	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  competitors.	  This	  pattern	  emerges	  when	  either	  the	  rate	  of	  substitution	  or	  the	  number	  of	  competitors	  are	  high,	  or	  both.	  This	  will	  be	  considered	  a	  high	  competition	  market.	  The	  second	  case,	  the	  effect	  increasing	  with	  the	  number	  of	  competitors	  emerges	  when	  both	  factors	  are	  low.	  Essentially	  this	  situation	  refers	  in	  a	  Bertrand	  model	  to	  a	  low	  competition	  market.	  The	  pattern	  of	  the	  reform’s	  effect	  at	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  firms	  therefore	  depends	  on	  the	  initial	  level	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  market.	  	  To	  investigate	  what	  the	  case	  best	  describes	  this	  market	  a	  second	  regression	  will	  be	  conducted	  estimating	  the	  effect	  of	  reform	  as	  a	  function	  of	  different	  competition	  groups	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  derivate	  of	  the	  Bertrand	  model	  is	  presented	  in	  full	  in	  Appendix	  2.	  
Graph	  7.	  	  Derivative	  of	  Bertrand	  model	  with	  respect	  to	  𝝈	  
















Table	  5.	  Pre	  &	  Post	  Reform	  basic	  measurements	  
referred	  to	  as	  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝! .	  The	  number	  of	  competitors	  at	  a	  given	  time	  determines	  what	  group	  a	  product	  will	  be	  part	  of.	  In	  this	  study	  there	  will	  be	  six	  groups	  considered,	  ranging	  from	  the	  duopoly	  case	  to	  the	  case	  of	  a	  product	  facing	  competition	  from	  more	  than	  fifteen	  firms	  within	  their	  active	  substance.	  The	  first	  cluster	  will	  only	  contain	  the	  duopoly	  case	  since	  this	  is	  a	  case	  of	  special	  interest	  when	  competition	  is	  concerning.	  The	  second	  will	  be	  composed	  of	  products	  facing	  two	  to	  three	  competitors,	  third	  is	  four	  to	  five,	  fourth	  six	  to	  ten,	  the	  fifth	  is	  eleven	  to	  fifth	  teen	  and	  the	  sixth	  is	  containing	  all	  product	  facing	  from	  more	  that	  fifteen	  firms.	  The	  regression	  will	  estimate	  the	  effect	  by	  the	  interaction	  term	  between	  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝! 	  and	  dummy	  Reform*Generics	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  as	  the	  treatment	  effect.	  	  This	  model	  is	  defined	  as:	  
𝑙𝑛 𝑝 = 𝛼! + 𝜃!𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +   𝜃!𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 + 𝛼!𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝!!!!!   +  	  𝛽!(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝!!!!! ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠  ))+ 𝜀,	  
where	  𝐸 𝜀 = 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑉 𝜀 =   𝜎!!	  	  This	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  equation	  2.	  The	  estimated	  parameters	  𝛽! 	  will	  be	  the	  estimated	  average	  effect	  of	  the	  reform	  in	  the	  different	  competition	  groups.	  Compering	  these	  different	  estimations	  will	  give	  us	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  what	  role	  competition	  has	  played	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  reform.	  	  
	   Pre	  Reform	   	   Post	  Reform	  	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	   	   Mean Std.	  Dev. Min Max ln(p)	   1.884	   1.778	   -­‐5.530	   8.309	   	   1.838 1.776 -­‐5.416 8.309 
Generics	  	   0.932	   0.251	   0	   1	   	   0.932 0.251 0 1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝!	   8.415	   5.925	   0	   21	   	   8.415 5.925 0 21 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝!	   0.071	   0.256	   0	   1	   	   0.071 0.256 0 1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝!	   0.147	   0.354	   0	   1	   	   0.147 0.354 0 1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝!	   0.090	   0.286	   0	   1	   	   0.090 0.286 0 1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝!	   0.211	   0.408	   0	   1	   	   0.211 0.408 0 1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝!	   0.251	   0.434	   0	   1	   	   0.251 0.434 0 1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝!	   0.164	   0.370	   0	   1	   	   0.164	   0.370	   0	   1	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The	  control	  group,	  products	  not	  facing	  any	  competitor,	  account	  for	  6.8%	  of	  the	  data	  set.	  This	  amounts	  to	  a	  total	  of	  approximately	  600	  control	  products	  in	  the	  regression.	  The	  number	  of	  competitors	  a	  product	  faces	  is	  calculated	  by	  every	  time	  a	  new	  ruling	  has	  come	  into	  place.	  In	  total	  the	  products	  at	  most	  face	  competition	  from	  21	  firms	  at	  a	  specific	  time,	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  number	  of	  competitors	  are	  presented	  in	  Appendix	  4.	  The	  first	  group,	  the	  duopoly	  case,	  contain	  7.1%	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  observations.	  The	  second	  represents	  14.7%,	  the	  third	  9.0%.	  The	  two	  following,	  fourth	  and	  fifth	  contain	  21%	  and	  25%	  and	  the	  last	  accounted	  for	  16.4%	  of	  the	  observations.	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Table	  6.	  Equation	  1	  estimation	  results.	  
Notes:	  the	  asterisks	  **,	  *	  indicate	  significance	  at	  level	  0.05	  and	  0.01	  
based	  on	  robust	  standard	  errors.	  	  
	  




3.1.	  DiD	  regression	  results	  Estimating	  equation	  1	  using	  OLS	  estimators	  yields	  the	  results	  presented	  below	  in	  table	  6.	  	  
	   Estimation	  Results	  
	   	   	  	   Estimate	   Std.Error	  Generics	  	   -­‐0.7583**	   0.0094	  
Agreement	   -­‐0.0249	   0.0195	  
Reform	   -­‐0.0002	   0.0150	  
Reform*Generics	  	   -­‐0.0502**	   0.0155	  
α	   2.5917**	   0.0091	  
	  	  	  The	  coefficient	  of	  the	  interaction	  term	  is	  estimated	  to	  -­‐0.502	  with	  a	  standard	  error	  associated	  to	  it	  of	  0.0155.	  	  The	  statistical	  significance	  of	  this	  result	  is	  tested	  through	  a	  t-­‐test	  under	  a	  normality	  assumption	  based	  on	  the	  Gauss-­‐Markov	  assumptions	  and	  the	  Central	  Limit	  Theorem	  (CLT)	  (Casella	  G.	  &	  Berger	  R.	  L.,	  2002).	  This	  test	  is	  successful	  in	  rejecting	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  coefficient	  is	  equal	  to	  zero	  at	  a	  significance	  level	  of	  0.01.	  	  In	  order	  to	  study	  the	  magnitude	  of	  this	  treatment	  effect	  a	  confidence	  interval	  is	  constructed.	  The	  interval	  is	  based	  on	  the	  same	  assumptions	  as	  in	  the	  t-­‐test	  and	  a	  significance	  level	  of	  0.05.	  Both	  boundaries	  and	  the	  point	  estimation	  are	  transformed	  in	  order	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  relevant	  terms6.	  The	  intervals	  are	  constructed	  through	  inverting	  the	  t-­‐statistic	  (Casella	  G.	  &	  Berger	  R.	  L.,	  2002).	  The	  result	  is	  defined	  below:	  	   𝛽! − 𝑡!! ,!" ∗ 𝑠!! ≤ 𝛽! ≤ 𝛽! + 𝑡!! ,!" ∗ 𝑠!! 	  	  
Confidence	  Interval	  Estimation	  	  (α=0.05)	  
	   	   	  Lower	  Boundery	   Upper	  Boundery	   Point	  Estimate	  
-­‐7.74	   -­‐1.97	   -­‐4.90	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  transformation	  is:	   𝒆𝜷𝒊 − 𝟏 ∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟎	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Table	  8.	  Equation	  2	  estimation	  results.	  
Notes:	  the	  asterisks	  **,	  *	  indicate	  significance	  at	  level	  0.05	  and	  0.01	  
based	  on	  robust	  standard	  errors.	  	  
	  
	  The	  point	  estimation	  suggests	  that	  the	  reform	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  drop	  in	  price	  among	  the	  effected	  substances	  of	  4.90%.	  According	  to	  the	  confidence	  interval	  there	  is	  a	  95%	  probability	  that	  the	  interval	  [-­‐7.74.	  -­‐1.97]	  is	  covering	  the	  true	  treatment	  effect	  in	  the	  population.	  	  The	  group	  specific	  effect	  is	  estimated	  to	  -­‐0.7583,	  a	  result	  also	  significant	  at	  a	  0.01	  significance	  level.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  variable	  included	  to	  account	  for	  the	  agreement	  reached	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  manufacturers	  were	  estimated	  to	  -­‐0.0249,	  although	  not	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero.	  The	  full	  regression	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  Appendix	  5.	  
	  
3.2.	  The	  effect	  of	  competition	  Equation	  2	  was	  introduced	  as	  to	  estimate	  what	  role	  the	  number	  of	  competitors	  played.	  The	  model	  was	  estimated	  using	  OLS	  and	  the	  results	  are	  presented	  below.	  	  	  
	   Estimation	  Results	  
	   	   	  
	  
Estimate	   Std.Error	  
Agreement	   -­‐0.0249	   0.0192	  
Reform	   -­‐0.0002	   0.0150	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟏	   -­‐0.9210**	   0.0122	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟐	   -­‐0.5208**	   0.0110	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟑	   -­‐0.6859**	   0.0107	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟒	   -­‐0.3413**	   0.0101	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟓	   -­‐1.1185**	   0.0101	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟔	   -­‐0.9248**	   0.0106	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟏 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎	   0.0018	   0.0203	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟐 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎	   -­‐0.0190	   0.0183	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟑 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎	   -­‐0.0430*	   0.0177	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟒 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎	   -­‐0.0499**	   0.0168	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟓 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎	   -­‐0.0606**	   0.0167	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟔 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎	   -­‐0.0892**	   0.0177	  
α	   2.5917**	   0.0091	  
	  	  	  Based	  on	  the	  same	  assumptions	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  t-­‐tests	  are	  conducted	  to	  make	  inference	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  parameters	  being	  equal	  to	  zero.	  Result	  of	  these	  test	  are	  presented	  in	  full	  in	  Appendix	  5.	  Notable	  results	  are	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  reform	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Table	  9.	  Interval	  estimation	  of	  the	  point	  estimations	  𝛃𝟏  𝐭𝐨  𝛃𝟔.	  
	  	  
among	  the	  lower	  stratum,	  the	  duopoly	  case	  and	  stratum	  1,	  failed	  to	  display	  any	  effect	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero.	  The	  group	  containing	  substances	  facing	  competition	  from	  3	  or	  4	  different	  firms	  displayed	  an	  effect	  estimated	  to	  -­‐0.0430	  significant	  at	  significance	  level	  0.05.	  From	  there	  on	  the	  effect	  seems	  to	  increase	  with	  the	  number	  of	  competitors,	  all	  point	  estimations	  significantly	  differ	  from	  zero	  at	  the	  significance	  level	  of	  0.01.	  	  To	  interpret	  the	  results	  in	  exact	  percentages	  the	  results	  are	  transformed	  back	  into	  there	  multiplicative	  form.	  The	  following	  table	  presents	  the	  all	  point	  estimation	  along	  with	  the	  upper	  and	  lower	  boundary	  levels	  of	  the	  confidence	  interval.	  	  	  
Confidence	  Interval	  Estimation	  	  (α=0.05)	  
	  
	   	   	  Group	   Lower	  Boundary	   Upper	  Boundary	   Point	  Estimate	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟏	   -­‐3.72	   4.24	   0.18	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟐	   -­‐5.33	   1.70	   -­‐1.88	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟑	   -­‐7.47	   -­‐0.83	   -­‐4.21	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟒	   -­‐7.95	   -­‐1.68	   -­‐4.86	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟓	   -­‐8.92	   -­‐2.74	   -­‐5.88	  𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝟔	   -­‐11.65	   -­‐5.30	   -­‐8.53	  
	  	  The	  estimated	  effect	  of	  the	  reform	  among	  the	  products	  facing	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  competitors	  are	  estimated	  to	  be	  -­‐8.53%,	  and	  when	  considering	  the	  standard	  error	  the	  true	  effect	  is	  expected	  to	  lay	  between	  -­‐11.65%	  and	  -­‐5.30%.	  This	  result	  is	  vastly	  different	  from	  the	  estimated	  effect	  among	  products	  facing	  duopoly	  competition.	  Among	  these	  products	  the	  effect	  is	  estimated	  to	  0.18%,	  virtually	  zero.	  The	  effect	  in	  the	  third	  and	  fourth	  group	  was	  -­‐4.21%	  and	  -­‐4.81%	  with	  both	  estimates	  being	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero.	  The	  fifth	  group	  displayed	  an	  observed	  effect	  of	  -­‐5.88%	  also	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  the	  significance	  level	  of	  0.01.	  Except	  for	  the	  duopoly	  case	  only	  the	  second	  group,	  product	  facing	  2-­‐3	  competitors	  within	  their	  active	  substance	  failed	  to	  produce	  an	  estimate	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero.	  The	  average	  effect	  in	  this	  group	  is	  with	  95%	  probability	  covered	  in	  the	  closed	  interval	  [-­‐5.33,1.70].	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3.3.	  Concluding	  remarks	  This	  paper	  was	  made	  possible	  trough	  the	  data	  publicly	  available	  through	  TLV.	  But	  therein	  lays	  also	  the	  limitations.	  	  In	  order	  to	  further	  expand	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  new	  mode	  of	  procedure	  concerning	  mandatory	  substitution	  in	  Sweden	  more	  in-­‐depth	  data	  is	  needed	  e.g.	  data	  on	  sale	  quantities	  would	  have	  made	  the	  effect	  on	  cost	  possible	  to	  estimate.	  Further,	  observations	  on	  what	  product	  was	  a	  generic	  copy	  and	  which	  was	  brand-­‐name	  product	  would	  have	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  separate	  the	  effect	  between	  them,	  which	  has	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  many	  previous	  studies.	  But	  most	  important	  are	  the	  limitations	  in	  the	  timeframe,	  which	  are	  imposed	  on	  this	  study.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  data	  from	  TLV	  stretched	  from	  2002	  to	  2012	  the	  control	  group	  could	  not	  be	  made	  to	  hold	  the	  parallel	  trend	  assumption	  for	  that	  long	  a	  time	  period.	  Thereby	  limiting	  the	  effect	  to	  be	  estimated	  only	  in	  the	  following	  eight	  months,	  the	  result	  is	  therefore	  limited	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  somewhat	  of	  an	  initial	  effect.	  When	  writing,	  it	  seems	  that	  a	  control	  group	  consisting	  of	  products	  that	  are	  not	  included	  in	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  government	  but	  yet	  faces	  competition,	  would	  open	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  expanding	  the	  analysis	  into	  a	  long-­‐term	  evaluation.	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destring Styrka, generate (Styrka2) 
ignore("qwertyuiopåasdfghjköäzxcvbnm-QWRYOPÅASDFGHJKLÖÄZXCVBNM") 
force 
sort Styrka2, stable 
drop if Gllerfrom<td(1,1,2000) 
drop if Gllerfrom>td(1,1,2013) 
drop if NPLpackid=="0" 
drop if NPLpackid=="." 
drop if NPLpackid=="2" 
drop if NPLpackid=="1" 
drop if NPLpackid=="11111111111113" 
drop if Fretag=="" 
drop if Styrka2==. 
 
replace ATCkod = subinstr(ATCkod," ","",.) 
joinby ATCkod using 
"/Users/rasmuslonn/Documents/Uppsats/NEK/Data/Index ATC:DDD.dta" 
drop if Enhet== "ml" | Enhet== " " | Enhet== "TU" | Enhet== "tablet" 
| Enhet== "U" | Enhet=="mmol" 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, "1","",.) 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, "2","",.) 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, "3","",.) 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, "4","",.) 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, "5","",.) 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, "6","",.) 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, "7","",.) 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, "8","",.) 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, "9","",.) 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, "0","",.) 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, ".","",.) 
replace Styrka = subinstr(Styrka, " ","",.) 
drop if Styrka ==" " 
 
replace Styrka2= Styrka2/1000 if Styrka=="mg" & Enhet=="g" 
replace Styrka2= Styrka2*1000 if Styrka=="g" & Enhet=="mg" 
replace Styrka2= Styrka2/1000 if Styrka=="mikrogram" & Enhet=="mg" 
replace Styrka2= Styrka2/1000 if Styrka=="mikrog" & Enhet=="mg" 
replace Styrka2= Styrka2*1000 if Styrka=="mg" & Enhet=="mcg" 
 
replace NyttAIP=. if NyttAIP==0 
replace TidigareAIP=. if TidigareAIP==0 
 




replace TidigareAIP=999 if TidigareAIP==. 
replace NyttAIP=9999 if NyttAIP==. 
 
qui duplicates tag NPLpackid Gllerfrom, gen(dup_id) 
qui sort NPLpackid Gllerfrom, stable 
qui gen n=1 
qui replace n=sum(n) 
qui egen N=max(n) 
scalar obs=N 
tsset n 
qui gen dup=0 
qui replace dup=1 if dup_id==1 & Gllerfrom==l.Gllerfrom 
count if dup==1 
drop if dup==1 
drop dup_id dup n N 
 
qui sort NPLpackid Gllerfrom, stable 
qui gen n=1 
qui replace n=sum(n) 
qui egen N=max(n) 
scalar obs=N 
drop n N 
 
sort ATCkod Fretag, stable 
range obs 1 `=scalar(obs)' `=scalar(obs)' 
tsset obs 
 
drop if Styrka2==. 




qui destring NPLpackid, ignore(" " | ".") replace 
qui format %20.0g NPLpackid 
 
qui destring NPLid, ignore(" " | ".") replace 
qui format %20.0g NPLid 
 
qui gen t=Gllerfrom 
drop DDD Enhet Styrka NyttAIP obs NPLid 
gen double NPLpackid2=NPLpackid 
qui format %20.0g NPLpackid2 
ren NyttAIP2 NyttAIP 
 
timer off 2 
 
/* Här börjar transponeringarna*/ 
timer on 3 
 
qui reshape wide NyttAIP TidigareAIP t, i(NPLpackid) j(Gllerfrom) 
qui format %25.0g NPLpackid 
 
qui gen n=1 
qui replace n=sum(n) 
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qui egen N=max(n) 
qui scalar N=N 
qui drop N n 
 
qui xpose, clear promote 
 
/* Här slutar transponeringarna*/ 
 
timer off 3 
/* Fyll ut serierna så vi inte saknar några värden förutom vid 
utträden*/ 
timer on 4 
 
qui gen n=1 





qui egen double t = rowmax(v1 - v`=scalar(N)') 
qui replace t=. in 1 
qui replace t=. if t<15000  
qui replace t=. if f.t!=. 
qui format t %td 
 
forvalues i = 1/`=scalar(N)' { 
qui replace v`i'=. if v`i'>15000 & _n!=1 & _n!=_N 
} 
 
qui format %20.0g v1 - v`=scalar(N)' 
 
qui replace t=f.t 
qui replace t=l.t if t==. 
qui replace t=t[3] in 2 
 
gen start=1 if 
t>=td(`=scalar(start_dag)',`=scalar(start_manad)',`=scalar(start_ar)
') & t!=. 
gen calibrering=n if start!=1 
egen start_period=max(calibrering) 
scalar start_t= start_period[1] 
 
forvalues i = 1/`=scalar(N)'{ 
qui replace v`i'=l.v`i' if v`i'==. & l.v`i'<1000000 & l.v`i'!=999 & 
l.v`i'!=9999 
} 
forvalues i = 1/`=scalar(N)' { 
while v`i'[2]==. { 
qui replace v`i'=f.v`i' if v`i'==. 
} 
}  
forvalues i =1/`=scalar(N)'{ 
qui replace v`i'=9999 if l.v`i'==9999 
} 
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forvalues i =1/`=scalar(N)'{ 
qui replace v`i'=. if v`i'==999 | v`i'==9999 
} 
forvalues i = 1/`=scalar(N)'{ 
qui replace v`i'=. if v`i'[_N]==.  
} 
forvalues i = 1/`=scalar(N)'{ 
qui replace v`i'=. if v`i'[`=scalar(start_t)']==. 
} 
forvalues i = 1/`=scalar(N)'{ 
qui replace v`i'=l.v`i' if v`i'==. & l.v`i'!=. & f.v`i'!=. 
} 
 
drop if _n==1 
timer off 4 
  
keep v1-v`=scalar(N)' t 
 
drop if _n==_N-1 
duplicates drop t, force 
qui reshape long v, i(t) j(Produkt) 
 
ren v p 
 
bysort Produkt: egen double NPLpackid=max(p) 
qui format %20.0g NPLpackid 
qui replace NPLpackid=. if p==. 
 
qui merge m:m NPLpackid using 
"/Users/rasmuslonn/Documents/Uppsats/NEK/Data/ADV_NPL2.dta" 
 
drop if p==. 
drop if t>td(1,1,2015) 
drop if p>10000000000 	  
Appendix	  2	  –	  Derivate	  of	  Bertrand	  model	  	  
	   𝑝 = 1− 𝜎 𝛼 + 1+ (𝑛 − 2)𝜎 𝑐2 1+ (𝑛 − 2)𝜎 − (𝑛 − 1)𝜎	  
Where	  c	  denotes	  marginal	  cost,	  𝛼	  equals	  demand	  intercept	  and	  𝜎	  is	  rate	  of	  substitusion	  
varying	  between	  0	  and	  1.	  Assuming	  c<	  𝛼.	  
	   𝜕𝑃𝜕𝜎 = ((−1+ 𝑛)  (𝑐 − 𝛼))2+ −3+ 𝑛 𝜎 ! 	  
	   𝜕!𝑃𝜕𝜎𝜕𝑛 = −((𝑐 − 𝛼)  (−2+ 𝜎 + 𝑛  𝜎))(2+ (−3+ 𝑛)  𝜎)! 	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Appendix	  3	  –	  Placebo	  regression	  The	  placebo	  regression	  is	  specified	  as:	  	   𝑙𝑛 𝑝 = 𝛼  + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑓 + 𝛽!𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 + 𝛽! 𝑅𝑒𝑓 ∗ 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜 + 𝜀,	  
where	  𝐸 𝜀 = 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑉 𝜀 =   𝜎! 	  	  The	  placebo	  variable,	  Placebo,	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  fake	  reform.	  The	  fake	  reform	  is	  implemented	  in	  February	  2009	  and	  if	  the	  parallel	  trend	  assumption	  holds	  up	  the	  estimated	  effect	  of	  this	  reform	  wont	  be	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero.	  	  
Linear	  regression	  
	   	   	   	   	  ln(p)	   Coef.	   Robust	  Std.	  Err.	   t	   P>t	  
	  Generics	  	   -­‐.7427415	   .0256223	   -­‐28.99	   	  0.000	  	   Number	  of	  obs	  =	  	  629625	  
reform1	   -­‐.0227258	   .0194846	   -­‐1.17	   0.243	   F(	  	  4,629620)	  =	  1643.79	  
placebo_reform	   .000966	   .0266829	   0.04	   0.971	   Prob	  >	  F	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  0.0000	  
placebo_treatment	   -­‐.017909	   .0275232	   -­‐0.65	   0.515	  	   R-­‐squared	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  0.0115	  
_cons	   2.590808	   .0248385	   104.31	   0.000	  	   Root	  MSE	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  1.7676	  	  The	  regression	  renders	  it	  obvious	  that	  the	  placebo	  reform	  was	  insignificant.	  Therefore	  the	  parallel	  trend	  assumption	  is	  holding	  up.	  
	  




















	   	   	   	  p	   Coef,	   Std,	  Err,	   t	   P>t	   [95%	  Conf,	   Interval]	  
Generics	  	   -­‐0,7582627	   0,0093568	   -­‐81,04	   0	   -­‐0,7766016	   -­‐0,7399237	  
reform1	   -­‐0,0248517	   0,0194644	   -­‐1,28	   0,202	   -­‐0,0630013	   0,0132979	  
reform2	   -­‐0,0001938	   0,015028	   -­‐0,01	   0,99	   -­‐0,0296482	   0,0292606	  
treatment2	   -­‐0,0502262	   0,0154988	   -­‐3,24	   0,001	   -­‐0,0806034	   -­‐0,019849	  





	   	   	   	  p	   Coef,	   Std,	  Err,	   t	   P>t	   [95%	  Conf,	   Interval]	  
reform1	   -­‐0,0248517	   0,0191874	   -­‐1,3	   0,195	   -­‐0,0624584	   0,012755	  
reform2	   -­‐0,0001938	   0,015028	   -­‐0,01	   0,99	   -­‐0,0296482	   0,0292606	  
stratum_1	   -­‐0,9210485	   0,0122328	   -­‐75,29	   0	   -­‐0,9450245	   -­‐0,8970725	  
stratum_2	   -­‐0,5207572	   0,0110096	   -­‐47,3	   0	   -­‐0,5423356	   -­‐0,4991788	  
stratum_3	   -­‐0,6859373	   0,0106697	   -­‐64,29	   0	   -­‐0,7068495	   -­‐0,6650251	  
stratum_4	   -­‐0,3412716	   0,0101365	   -­‐33,67	   0	   -­‐0,3611389	   -­‐0,3214044	  
stratum_5	   -­‐1,118464	   0,0101122	   -­‐110,61	   0	   -­‐1,138284	   -­‐1,098645	  
stratum_6	   -­‐0,9247634	   0,0106879	   -­‐86,52	   0	   -­‐0,9457113	   -­‐0,9038155	  
treat_strat1	   0,0017689	   0,0202666	   0,09	   0,93	   -­‐0,0379529	   0,0414908	  
treat_strat2	   -­‐0,018956	   0,0182516	   -­‐1,04	   0,299	   -­‐0,0547286	   0,0168166	  
treat_strat3	   -­‐0,0429932	   0,0176711	   -­‐2,43	   0,015	   -­‐0,0776279	   -­‐0,0083586	  
treat_strat4	   -­‐0,0498725	   0,0167946	   -­‐2,97	   0,003	   -­‐0,0827894	   -­‐0,0169556	  
treat_strat5	   -­‐0,0606044	   0,0167214	   -­‐3,62	   0	   -­‐0,0933778	   -­‐0,027831	  
treat_strat6	   -­‐0,0891534	   0,0177065	   -­‐5,04	   0	   -­‐0,1238575	   -­‐0,0544493	  
_cons	   2,591674	   0,0090741	   285,61	   0	   2,573889	   2,609459	  
	  
